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The Balkan Investigation 
 
By William Schabas 
 
The direct ancestor of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia – the institution that confirmed the 
rebirth of international criminal justice – was the Commission 
of Experts. Comprised of five members, several of them 
specialists in international law, the Commission’s establishment 
was mandated by the Security Council. Resolution 780, adopted 
unanimously on 6 October 1992, was charged with investigating 
‘grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations 
of international humanitarian law committed during the conflict 
in the former Yugoslavia’. 
It was the most robust measure that had then been taken by 
the United Nations in order to deal with a conflict whose 
beginnings dated back more than a year, and that had featured 
battles and atrocities over a period of several months as 
Slovenia and then Croatia broke away from Yugoslavia to became 
independent states. The worst of the conflict, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where the three main ethnic groups were more 
balanced in numbers and where no single one could claim a 
majority, was only then getting underway. Desperate but 
unsuccessful political initiatives to address the crisis had 
been launched since 1991. But it was only in mid-1992 that the 
Security Council began to use the language of international 
criminal justice. In August 1992 it adopted a resolution that 
said perpetrators ‘will be individually [held] responsible’. 
The August resolution had been provoked by stunning 
revelations of atrocities in the Omarska concentration camp. The 
resolution referred to ‘reports of mass forcible expulsion and 
deportation of civilians, imprisonment and abuse of civilians 
in detention centres, deliberate attacks on non-combatants, 
hospitals and ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and 
medical supplies to the civilian population, and wanton 
devastation and destruction of property’. 
 
Early justice initiatives in the Balkans 
 
This wasn’t the first time international law had turned its 
attention to the Balkans. One of the very earliest international 
fact-finding or expert commissions of inquiry was set up in 
1913, at the dawn of the First World War. An unofficial body 
backed by the young Carnegie Endowment, it investigated 
violations in the conflicts that afflicted the territory of what 
would later be called ‘Yugoslavia’. The Commission’s report 
invoked two of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 as a basis 
for concluding that war crimes had been perpetrated by various 
forces in the conflict. Cherif Bassiouni has written that the 
atrocities documented by the Commission of Experts bear a 
‘haunting resemblance’ to those in the report of the 1913 
Carnegie Commission. 
After the First World War there were calls for 
international prosecution of war crimes. A Commission on 
Responsibilities set up by the Preliminary Peace Congress 
compiled evidence of atrocities, including rapes, torture, 
killing of hostages and ‘denaturalisation’, a notion akin with 
similarities to what is today the crime of genocide, perpetrated 
by the Austrians and their allies in the Balkans. Greece, Serbia 
and Romania managed to convince the Commission that the peace 
treaty with Bulgaria should provide for an international 
criminal court to prosecute individual perpetrators. However, 
the measure was vetoed by the French prime minister after the 
Americans objected. 
And then there was the Nuremberg trial in 1945 and 1946. 
It did not focus on the Balkans at such, of course, but in its 
more general treatment of Nazi atrocity throughout the occupied 
continent the region was not neglected. The International 
Military Tribunal heard evidence of the mass murder of hostages, 
perpetrated in Yugoslavia by the Gestapo. In its judgment, it 
noted Hitler’s instruction to his generals that Yugoslavia was 
to be destroyed with ‘unmerciful harshness’. 
Thus, when the Security Council flagged the perpetration 
of war crimes in the Balkans in October 1992, the initiative to 
investigate atrocities in that sorry region was not being cut 
from whole cloth. International criminal law was only just 
awakening from its forty-year hibernation. The invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 had prompted calls for an international 
criminal tribunal to try the crime of aggression as well as for 
a fact-finding commission similar to what was called for in 
Resolution 680, but neither initiative bore fruit. A related 
idea, that of a ‘truth commission’, was also starting to appear 
on the international radar screen. A UN-backed initiative that 
was led by a distinguished American judge, Thomas Buergenthal, 
had recently completed its study of atrocities in El Salvador. 
All of this contributed to a context in which, as Victor Hugo 
wrote, nothing could stop an idea whose time had come. 
In August 1992, the Special Rapporteur on the former 
Yugoslavia who had been appointed by the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, produced a report that proposed the 
establishment of an international commission of inquiry. Within 
the Department of State, a young international lawyer, Michael 
Scharf, was preparing draft language for a Security Council 
resolution whereby such a body would be authorized. 
During the negotiations of the text of Resolution 680, the 
United Kingdom, France and Russia agreed on setting up a fact-
finding body, but wanted to call it a ‘committee’. The United 
States insisted that the body be called a ‘commission’, 
apparently having in mind the precedent of the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission. That institution had begun its work in 
London in early 1944 and was seen, then and now, as a precursor 
of the International Military Tribunal. 
 
Establishing the Commission of Experts 
 
Under Resolution 680, the Secretary-General was charged 
with implementing the will of the Security Council. The 
Resolution did not specify the size of the Commission. 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali chose to appoint a ‘Magnificent 
Five’, all of them men, something that would be unthinkable 
today. Nor did they represent the five geographic groups in the 
United Nations, as is the tradition, but care was taken to ensure 
that none of them were from a permanent member of the Security 
Council 
Three of them were distinguished academics: Frits 
Kalshoven, of Leiden University in the Netherlands, Torkel 
Opsahl, of the University of Oslo, and Cherif Bassiouni, an 
Egyptian national working at De Paul University in the United 
States. Each was a distinguished scholar in what were then still 
relatively obscure fields, international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law, at least by comparison with the 
present day. The other two members of the Commission were William 
Fenrick, an accomplished Canadian military lawyer, and Keba 
M’Baye, a Senegalese judge who had served on the International 
Court of Justice. Kalshoven was named Chairman of the 
Commission. 
The Commission of Experts was frustrated from the start, 
and throughout its work, both by its lack of appropriate funding 
and by an apparently uncooperative United Nations bureaucracy 
characterized by extreme caution and even inertia. But it also 
had to contend with serious concerns, both within the UN and 
from powerful States and international personalities, that by 
focussing upon justice the Commission of Experts might 
complicate efforts to negotiate peace. Some thought that an 
effective fact-finding commission, with the means to document 
violations of international law, could get in the way of 
political compromise. 
Even before the Commission first met, it attracted 
attention from other bodies concerned with investigation of 
atrocities in the Balkan conflict. Acting upon a report prepared 
by a three-person committee of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe that included the Swedish judge Hans 
Corell, the Conference’s Committee of Senior Officials 
recommended, in early November 1992, that ‘[t]he United Nations 
Commission of Experts should give particular attention to the 
principle of personal responsibility for war crimes and examine 
how this principle could be put into practice by an ad hoc 
tribunal’. 
The Commission began meeting in Geneva, in November 1992, 
in one of the conference rooms of the old Palais des Nations, 
originally built as the headquarters of the League of Nations. 
Provided with only limited information from Member States, and 
without yet having undertaken its own fact-finding, the 
Commission of Experts focussed on the legal dimension of its 
task. This was something for which the members were well-suited, 
given their undoubted and widely acknowledged expertise. 
Ironically, as the Commission of Experts was convening in 
December 1992, the Secretary of State of the United Nations was 
delivering a dramatic speech in another of the conference rooms 
down the corridor in the same building. In the final weeks of 
his cabinet term within the Bush administration, Lawrence 
Eagleburger named several individuals whom he said should be 
held personally responsible, including Radovan Karadžić, Ratko 
Mladić, Slobodan Milošević, Vojislav Šešelj and Adem Delić. They 
were described as individuals who should be prosecuted for war 
crimes and, indeed, they all would later stand in the dock before 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
In January 1993, the Commission began taking steps to 
address the inadequacy of its funding. It proposed that the 
United Nations set up a trust fund into which Member States 
could make voluntary contributions, seemingly simple matter. 
Lawyers inside the UN opposed the idea, arguing that it had not 
been specifically contemplated by the Security Council 
resolution. In March, the General Assembly agreed to create a 
trust fund. Almost immediately the United States contributed 
half a million dollars. Later, under the creative leadership of 
Cherif Bassiouni, additional resources were tapped from 
governments as well as from private sources, notably 
philanthropic foundations with a human rights orientation. 
 
The first interim report 
 
The Commission of Experts presented it first interim report 
to the United Nations Security Council in early February 1993. 
The report attempted a definition of ‘ethnic cleansing’, a 
rather new term that was appearing increasingly in journalistic 
sources, popular accounts and political debates. For the 
Commission, ‘ethnic cleansing’ consisted of ‘rendering an area 
wholly homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove 
persons of given groups from the area’. Its definition was later 
endorsed by the International Court of Justice in its February 
2007 judgment in the Bosnia v. Serbia case. 
The Commission concluded that ‘ethnic cleansing’ had been 
perpetrated ‘by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and 
detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, 
confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible 
removal, displacement and deportation of civilians, deliberate 
military attacks or threats of attacks on civilian areas, and 
wanton destruction of property’. For the Commission, these were 
both war crimes and crimes against humanity and, potentially, 
even genocide. 
The Resolution 680 Commission of Experts was not the first 
to use the language of international criminal law to describe 
the Balkan conflict. But the prestige of its members, and 
especially the great authority they possessed in the relevant 
areas of international law, cloaked its findings in gravitas. 
This was not a case of inexpert politicians or journalists 
throwing around provocative language, often in a demagogic 
context. Rather, eminent scholars in the field, sitting as 
members of an official United Nations Commission, had made 
authoritative preliminary findings. 
The February report of the Commission considered the 
establishment of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal that 
might be charged with prosecuting the crimes it was then 
identifying. The Commission of Experts said that ‘it would be 
for the Security Council or another competent organ of the United 
Nations to establish such a tribunal’, adding that such a move 
would be ‘consistent with the direction’ that the work of the 
Commission had taken. The Commission was not the first body to 
propose an international tribunal, but by adding the weight of 
its view to the debate, it may well have helped tipped the 
scales. 
Within days, the Security Council adopted Resolution 808 
whereby it ‘[d]ecide[d]’ that an international criminal tribunal 
shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991’. 
Three months later, in May 1993, the Security Council adopted 
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia. 
Nearly half a century had passed since the establishment 
of the first generation of international criminal courts, at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo. In May 1993, nobody would have expected 
that the Tribunal would only conclude its operations in December 
2017, and even then before its prosecutions were entirely 
finished. A successor institution known as the Mechanism for the 
International Criminal Tribunals would then be required for the 
final appeals and retrials, and for future unforeseen 
developments such as the arrest of remaining suspects and the 
discovery of new evidence. 
 
Laying the groundwork for prosecution 
 
Adoption of Security Council Resolution 827 in May did not 
immediately shift the centre of gravity to the new tribunal. It 
would take nearly a year for the International Criminal Tribunal 
to become fully operational. Judges were only elected in 
November 1993, and eight more months would pass before a 
Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, took the reins. In the meantime, 
the Commission of Inquiry pursued its important work. This had 
been understood by the Security Council. The preamble of 
Resolution 827 stated that ‘pending the appointment of the 
Prosecutor of the International Tribunal, the Commission of 
Experts established pursuant to resolution 780 (1992) should 
continue on an urgent basis the collection of information 
relating to evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
and other violations of international humanitarian law as 
proposed in its interim report’. As well as confirming the 
Council’s confidence in the work of the Commission of Experts, 
this also confirmed the vital relationship between the 
Commission and the Tribunal. Cherif Bassiouni would later 
describe the Commission of Experts as ‘the first stage in the 
establishment of the Tribunal’. 
Frits Kalshoven resigned from the Commission of Experts in 
September 1993, openly protesting the lack of political support 
from major governments, including France and the United Kingdom. 
He pointed to the failure to provide any logistical or financial 
assisting, complaining that it was unacceptable for the Security 
Council to vote to create a body and then deny it the means to 
implement its decision. Regrettably, nearly a quarter of a 
century later, the problem persists. A few weeks after 
Kalshoven’s gesture, the Norwegian member of the Commission, 
Torkel Opsahl, died suddenly. 
But far from withering under the impact of these two blows, 
as some cynical observers predicted at the time, the Commission 
was suddenly invigorated by the appointment of Cherif Bassiouni 
as chairman. It was in many ways the finest hour for the great 
Egyptian international lawyer, who had done so much throughout 
his career of many decades to keep the flame of international 
justice alight. Polyglot and polymath, Bassiouni had been 
teaching international law at DePaul University in Chicago since 
the 1960s. In the early 1970s, he took on the leadership of the 
International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, 
known since 2016 as the Siracusa Institute. Over the years, 
international experts gathered periodically for conferences and 
expert panels at the Institute’s seat in Siracusa, on the Italian 
island of Sicily, to discuss and debate issues of international 
criminal law and human rights. 
Bassiouni immediately took steps to address the funding 
challenges, defying the entreaties of senior lawyers within the 
United Nations system. He also enlisted pro bono professionals 
and legions of law students who were thrilled to direct their 
energies to real problems in one of the world’s great crises. 
By early 1994, the Commission had collected some 65,000 
documents which were catalogued and organised in a data base 
located in Chicago, as well as a computerized archive comprising 
hundreds of hours of testimony. 
Another Commissioner, William Fenrick of Canada, directed 
a series of thirty-four field investigations. These included the 
excavation of several mass graves in the conflict region. Later, 
Fenrick migrated to the International Criminal Tribunal, 
together with one of his deputies on the Commission of Experts, 
Payam Akhavan. Both became valued senior staff members of the 
Office of the Prosecutor in the early days of its activities. 
In this way, much of the institutional memory and expertise of 
the Commission, acquired before the Tribunal existed but 
principally during the first year when it was not fully 
functional, was informally transferred to the Tribunal. 
The Commission was also energized by the addition of two 
women members, appointed to replace Kaltshoven and Opsahl. Dutch 
legal academic Christine Cleirin took charge of investigations 
into rape and sexual assault, directing a team of forty women 
lawyers, psychologists and interpreters. More than 200 victims 
or witnesses to sexual and gender-based violence were 
interviewed by the Commission. Hanne Sophie Greve, a Norwegian 
judge, conducted an investigation into the ethnic cleansing of 
Prijedor, something that was later documented in the judgments 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. When Prosecutor Richard Goldstone initiated 
proceedings against Tadić in November 1994, the written 
application relied upon evidence gathered by the Commission of 
Experts. 
In the case law of the Tribunal itself, the Commission 
seems to have made more of a mark for its legal conclusions and 
analysis than for its very substantial factual findings. Perhaps 
that is because the Commission’s report could not readily have 
been admissible as evidence. The facts it uncovered had to be 
subject to independent proof during the trials. On the other 
hand, the views of the Commission of Experts on matters like 
command responsibility, a notion about which the post-Second 
World War proceedings were rather thin, proved both helpful and 
persuasive. The doctrine of command responsibility, set out in 
article 7 of the Statute of the Tribunal permits the conviction 
of a military and even a civilian superior for the acts of 
subordinates to the extent that the superior should have known 
that the crimes might be committed. The Commission’s conclusions 
about the admissibility of circumstantial evidence and the 
mental element of international criminality also influenced the 
case law of the Tribunal. 
In December 1993, the Commission was informed by the Legal 
Advisor to the Secretary-General that its mandate was to 
conclude at the end of April 1994, a ruling that was inconsistent 
with the Security Council’s instruction that the Commission 
continue its work until a Prosecutor was appointed. In a 
technical sense, a Prosecutor had been appointed by then, 
although he never really took up the job. The fledgling office 
had to await the arrival of Richard Goldstone, in July 1994. 
 Welcoming its final report and the voluminous annexes, 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali said: ‘The material and 
information collected and recorded in the data base, now 
transferred to the Tribunal, will not only assist in the 
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, but will constitute a permanent 
documentary record of the crimes committed in the former 
Yugoslavia, and thus remain the memorial for the hundreds of 
thousands of its innocent victims.’ Amen. 
 
